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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STAfE OF UTAH 
GILBERT R. WILBURN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND 
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondents. 
Ccjnirt of A p p e a l s 
Ca^e No. 860202-CA 
C a t e g o r y No. 6 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT GILBERT R. WILBURN 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-83 (1986 Supplement) as a Petition 
for Review from an Order of the Industrial Commission denying 
appellant's Motion for Review. In the instant case, a hearing 
was held on May 14, 1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Administrative 
Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion presided. Following the 
hearing, on May 28, 1986, Judge Sumsion issued Interim 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order awarding 
benefits for permanent and total disability to the applicant. 
Respondents Interstate Electric Company (hereinafter 
"Interstate Electric") and National Union Fire Insurance 
Company of Pittsburgh (hereinafter "National Union") 
subsequently filed a Motion for Review pursuant to U.C.A. 
§35-1-82.53. Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge 
issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order denying Mr. Wilburn's claim. Following the issuance of 
the Supplemental Order, the appellant filed a Motion for Review 
to the Industrial Commission. Applicant's motion was denied 
and the order of the Administrative Law Judge affirmed on 
September 9, 1986. This Appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether a compromise and settlement agreement 
bars a worker's right to claim permanent total disability 
benefits where the language of the agreement does not purport 
to settle claims for permanent and total disability, either 
expressly or by implication. 
2. Whether a compromise and settlement agreement 
can properly waive an employee's right to compensation despite 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-90, where the issue of 
liability was not, in fact, doubtful. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellant respectfully contends that U.C.A. 
§35-1-90 (1953 as amended) is determinative of the issues 
to be decided in this case. Section 35-1-90 reads as follows: 
No agreement by an employee to waive his 
rights to compensation under this title 
shall be valid. No agreement by an 
employee to pay any portion of the premium 
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paid by his employer shall be v^lid. Any 
employer who deducts any portioh of such 
premium from the wages or salary of any 
employee entitled to the benefits of this 
title is guilty of a misdemeanour, and shall 
be fined not more than $100 for each such 
offense. (Emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASfi 
The facts pertinent to this cas^ are as follows: 
1. Appellant Gilbert Wilburn is a 66-year 
old man with a ninth grade education who l|as worked as a heavy 
duty mechanic all his life. (R. at 52.) 
2. At all times pertinent hereto, Mr. Wilburn 
was employed by respondent Interstate Elecftric as a mechanic, 
repairing and overhauling portable power plants, water pumps, 
oil pumps and hydraulic and telephone pol^ pullers. (R. at 53.) 
3. On April 14, 1984, Mr. Vifilburn attempted to 
lift a portable power plant weighing between seventy and ninety 
pounds from the floor to his work bench. (R. at 54, 84.) 
4. As he lifted the power ^lant and twisted to 
set it on his work bench, Mr. Wilburn felt a severe burning 
pain in his low back and abdomen. (R. at 54, 55.) 
5. The pain was so severe that it took his 
breath away forcing him to lean temporarily over the power 
plant and his work table in order to regaih his senses. He 
then walked to a nearby bench and laid dowh. (R. at 55, 56.) 
6. Mr. Wilburn promptly reported this incident 
to a co-worker, the shop foreman, and the ^hop manager. (R. at 
56, 57.) 
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7. He continued to work for the remainder of the 
day, as well as the two following days thinking the pain would 
pass with time. (R. at 57.) 
8. Finally, on the second day after this lifting 
incident, Mr. Wilburn was in such distress that he was forced 
to leave work and consult Dr. Gene Smith, an orthopedic 
surgeon. (R. at 58, 59.) 
9. Although he was able to return to work just a 
few days after the accident, Mr. Wilburn continued to 
experience significant pain in his low back and right side. 
(R. at 61.) 
10. On or about February 2, 1981, Mr. Wilburn 
was examined by Dr. Wally Hess pursuant to an independent 
medical examination requested by defendant National Union. 
Following his examination, Dr. Hess assigned Mr. Wilburn a 
permanent partial impairment rating of twenty percent (20%), 
fifteen percent of which he attributed to preexisting causes 
and five percent of which he attributed to aggravation of the 
preexisting condition by the industrial episode. (R. at 180.) 
11. Following the industrial incident at issue, 
Mr. Wilburn continued to work for Interstate Electric until 
July 31, 1981, when he was laid off. During this period of 
time, however, Mr. Wilburn1s condition continued to 
deteriorate. (R. at 65.) 
12. In August of 1981, Mr. Wilburn began seeing 
Dr. Gordon Affleck. In a letter dated February 10, 1982, 
directed to American International Adjustment Company, 
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(hereinafter "American International"), D^ :. Affleck stated 
that in his opinion Mr. Wilburn had at le^st a thirty percent 
(30%) permanent partial impairment with twenty percent 
attributable to preexisting conditions an<p. ten percent due to 
his industrial injury. (R. at 225.) 
13. On April 7, 1982, Dr. Affleck again wrote 
to American International, stating that Mt. Wilburn was 
suffering from a permanent disability of between twenty-five to 
forty percent. (R. at 227.) 
14. Following a second independent medical 
examination of Mr. Wilburn on June 20, 1983, Dr. Hess 
increased his permanent partial disability rating of Mr. 
Wilburn!s condition to thirty-six percent (36%) whole man, 
stating that fifteen percent of this ratiitg was due to problems 
with Mr. Wilburn1s cervical spine, fifteen percent was due to 
preexisting problems in his lumbar and luirfcosacral spine, and 
ten percent was due to problems related toi the industrial 
injury of his lumbosacral spine. (R. at 188, 189.) 
15. Inasmuch as his condition had materially 
worsened, Mr. Wilburn sought additional worker's compensation 
benefits. (R. at 27.) 
16. American International subsequently 
instructed Mr. Wilburn to meet with Stuart Poelman, counsel 
for respondents Interstate Electric and National Union, on 
February 24, 1984. (R. at 31.) 
17. During the course of Mr. Wilburnfs meeting 
with Mr. Poelman, Mr. Poelman claims that he informed Mr. 
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Wilburn of all of the defenses the respondents could raise, 
including the defense of no accident, if Mr. Wilburn were to 
file a claim for additional benefits. Mr. Poelman also told 
Mr. Wilburn that if the matter proceeded to a hearing and the 
respondents were to prevail, Mr. Wilburn would lose all 
workmen's compensation benefits, including his medical 
benefits. (R. at 110, 111.) 
18. Following their meeting, Mr. Poelman 
prepared the Compromise and Settlement Agreement (hereinafter 
"Agreement") at issue herein. Pursuant to its terms, Mr. 
Wilburn was paid additional temporary total disability in the 
amount of $1,590 for the period of September 20, through 
November 22, 1984, plus compensation for an additional five 
percent permanent partial disability from both the Employer and 
the Second Injury Fund. (R. at 114, 115.) 
19. Following his meeting with Mr. Poelman, Mr. 
Wilburn contacted Shaun Howell, legal counsel for the 
Commission regarding the Agreement and his possible claim. (R. 
at 114.) 
20. Ms. Howell discussed with Mr. Wilburn the 
various possible outcomes that could occur should he assert a 
claim and pursue it to a hearing. At no time, however, did Ms. 
Howell advise Mr. Wilburn whether or not he should sign the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement. (R. at 138, 140.) 
21. When Mr. Wilburn first approached Ms. 
Howell, he was uncertain as to the type of claim he should 
assert. Furthermore, he was extremely concerned about the 
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continuation of his compensation because h^ had not been able 
to return to work. (R. at 135.) 
22. Mr. Wilburn testified that by signing the 
Agreement, he understood he was compromising his then current 
claim for additional temporary total and permanent partial 
disability benefits. He further understood that he would not 
be precluded from seeking additional benefits in the future 
should his condition warrant them. (R. at 77, 78.) 
23. Mr. Wilburn!s understanding to this effect 
was due in part to the following provision contained in the 
Agreement itself: "The Employer and The Fund agree that The 
Fund will reimburse the Employer for two-thirds of all future 
medical expense and temporary total disability for which 
liability to the Applicant may be incurred." (R. at 78.) 
24. The Agreement does not mention at any place 
permanent and total disability or the effect its acceptance 
would purportedly have on Mr. Wilburn's right to assert such 
a claim in the future. (R. at 37-40.) 
25. On November 1, 1985, Drt Affleck increased 
Mr. Wilburn1s permanent total disability rating to forty-five 
percent (45%) stating that twelve percent is directly 
attributable to the industrial incident. (R. at 250.) 
26. Prior to the industrial incident at issue 
herein, Mr. Wilburn had had no problems with his back which 
had been serious enough to prevent him frim working. (R. at 
53, 82-83, 125.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because of the express provision in the Utah 
Workman's Compensation Act prohibiting the waiver of 
benefits by employees in worker's compensation matters, any 
Agreement which purports to compromise the right of a worker 
must be strictly construed in order to avoid an unlawful 
waiver. Furthermore, all doubts and ambiguities relative to 
the Agreement should be resolved in favor of the employee so 
that the beneficent purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act 
might be fulfilled. Where an alleged Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement does not specifically bar an employee's right to 
assert a future claim, the employee should not thereafter be 
precluded from asserting that claim. A holding to the contrary 
constitutes a waiver of the employee's right to compensation to 
which he is otherwise entitled. In the instant case, the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement signed by Mr. Wilburn 
does not specifically address the issue of permanent and total 
disability, nor does it purport to be a general release 
settling all of the claims Mr. Wilburn might raise as a 
result of the injuries he sustained on April 14, 1980, during 
the course of his employment. His claim for permanent total 




THE DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS NOT EXPRESSLY 
SETTLED BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONSTITUTES AN INVALID 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Utah Code Ann., §35-1-90 (1953 as amended) 
prohibits agreements by employees waiving their rights to 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. That 
section reads in part, as follows: 
No agreement by an employee to waive his 
rights to compensation under thi$ title 
shall be valid . . . 
In view of this clear statutory prohibition against waivers, 
settlement agreements affecting a worker's right to 
compensation must be carefully examined to ensure that no 
waiver takes place. Furthermore, such agreements must be 
strictly construed so that only those claims expressly settled 
by the parties are precluded from future pursuit. In the 
instant case, Mr. Wilburn seeks to assert a claim for 
permanent and total disability as a result of injuries he 
suffered while working for respondent Interstate Electric on 
April 14, 1980. Respondents allege that Mr. Wilburn's claim 
is barred by a Compromise and Settlement Agreement which was 
executed by him and the respondents and which was approved by 
the Commission on November 28, 1984. (A copy of the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 
"A.") However, a review of the Agreement executed by the 
parties undermines respondent's position. Nowhere is the issue 
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of permanent and total disability or the intended effect of the 
Agreement on such a claim discussed. Furthermore, there is no 
language in the Agreement suggesting that the alleged 
settlement achieved therein was intended to be a full and final 
settlement of all of Mr. Wilburn's claims arising out of the 
injuries he sustained on April 14, 1980. 
On page 2 of the Agreement, the first full paragraph, 
it states: 
WHEREAS, the Applicant now claims that he 
is entitled to additional benefits but the 
Employer and the Fund dispute said claim 
and also deny liability for any benefits 
which have been paid or are yet claimed by 
Applicant under the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act, . . . 
The type of claim and additional benefits sought by Mr. 
Wilburn as referred to in the above-cited paragraph are 
never specifically identified in the Agreement. The Agreement 
does provide for the payment of additional temporary total 
disability and additional permanent partial disability benefits 
to the cipplicant, but it does not say that the payment of those 
benefits is in lieu of Mr. Wilburn's assertion of a claim for 
permanent and total disability. 
Since the waiver of any rights to which an employee 
is otheirwise entitled is contrary to law, it stands to reason 
that where rights are not specifically addressed by an alleged 
settlement agreement, they cannot legitimately be said to have 
been compromised and settled. This conclusion is supported by 
the Decision in Cretella v. New York Dock Co., 289 N.Y. 
254, 45 N.E.2d 429 (1942.) In Cretella, the applicant 
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sought an award for permanent total disability benefits several 
years after receiving a "lump sum settlement" in 1934. New 
York law provided for the commutation of periodical benefits 
owed to a worker to one or more lump payments, (a "lump sum 
settlement") so long as certain factors were taken into 
consideration. The 1934 award did not follow the directions of 
the statute in computing the lump sum awarded to the applicant, 
however, and the Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the 
settlement was actually an attempt to compromise the injured 
employee's claim. The New York Workman's Compensation Act, 
like the Utah Act, contained a statute prohibiting waivers. In 
view of this provision, the Court held: 
True it is that our Compensation Law does 
not prohibit 'settlements' but, in view of 
the obvious and well-known policy and 
intent of the whole statute and in view of 
Sections 32 and 33, which forbid any waiver 
by a claimant of his right to compensation 
or any release by him of benefits due, such 
an express prohibition of 'settlement' was 
probably thought by the drafters to be 
unnecessary. We hold that there can be no 
valid compromise of the amounts due a 
claimant under this law. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 430. The court further noted that before the 
applicant had received the 1934 lump sum settlement, the 
Industrial Board had approved a number of other awards to him 
in 1928 and 1929 for partial, temporary disability, thus 
implying a finding of temporary partial disability. The Board 
had also approved one prior lump sum settlement in 1930, 
without making a specific finding as to the extent or probable 
duration of the applicant's disability. It then stated: 
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Since neither of these attempted 
'settlements1 involves any classification 
of claimant's disability, the only 
classifications discoverable here are those 
of partial, temporary disability implicit 
in the 1928 and 1929 awards above referred 
to. Those 1928-29 classifications were 
•erroneous and not in the interest of 
justice' since the Board has now found on 
sufficient proof that claimant is 
permanently totally disabled as a result of 
the 1928 accident. In a situation like 
this, Section 15, subdivision 6-a, of the 
Workman's Compensation Law permits 
reclassification 'at any time, without 
regard to the date of accident.' 
Id. at 431. 
The instant case is like Cretella in that the 
alleged settlement agreement does not refer to any 
classification of Mr. Wilburn's disability. Additionally, 
the only payments made under the Agreement are for temporary 
total and permanent partial disability, thus implying a finding 
of only permanent partial impairment on the part of Mr. 
Wilburn. Since Mr. Wilburn has presented sufficient 
evidence to show that his disability is, in fact, permanent and 
total, the Agreement cannot stand as a bar to his current 
claim. 
The same conclusion reached in Cretella has also 
been reached in more recent decisions. For example, in 
Wacome v. Paul Mushero Const. Co., 498 A.2d 593 (Me. 
1985), the plaintiff suffered an industrial injury to his left 
foot and lower back. Following the accident, the plaintiff and 
his employer entered into a compensation agreement which 
contained a description of the injury to his foot but did not 
contain a description of the injury to his back. Approximately 
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two years later, the employee sought additional recovery for 
his back injury which, at that time, had become disabling. The 
employer defended stating that the compensation agreement 
barred any further recovery for injuries arising out of the 
industrial accident in question. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine reversed the decision of the Commission denying 
additional benefits to the employee and stated: 
Only the employee's foot injuries were 
described in the approved settlement. The 
compensation paid was for the described 
foot injuries. The agreement dofes not 
purport to cover any injury to the 
employee's back, and no agreement exists 
between the parties concerning those 
injuries. The employee retains the legal 
right to seek compensation for the injury 
to his back. 
Id. at 594. 
The same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota in the case of Hanson v. Jer Her Builders, 366 
N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 1985). Therein, the plaintiff negotiated a 
settlement for an injury "in the nature of an injury to the 
eyes" for which he received compensation for "permanent partial 
disability of 13% of the visual field or tlfie body as a whole." 
Six weeks after signing the settlement agreement, the employee 
filed a second petition seeking additional benefits for a 15% 
permanent partial disability of the head. The employer denied 
liability on the grounds that the prior settlement had been a 
compromise of all permanent partial disability arising out of 
the accident leading to the plaintiff's injuries. The Supreme 
Court of Minnesota held that although the stipulated settlement 
was somewhat ambiguous, it contained no specific reference to 
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any permanent partial disability of the head. Therefore, the 
employee's claim for permanent partial disability to the head 
was not foreclosed. Id. at 298. Although the decisions in 
Wacome and Hanson deal specifically with claims for 
particular injuries allegedly settled via a compromise 
agreement, their holdings are equally applicable to the case at 
bar where the matter at issue is the type of claim purportedly 
settled. 
The conclusion reached by our own Utah Supreme Court 
in Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 135 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1943) also supports Mr. Wilburn's contention that only 
claims expressly compromised may be deemed barred from 
subsequent assertion. In Barber, the applicant suffered a 
compensable industrial injury. The medical panel gave him a 5% 
permanent partial disability rating which he disputed. He 
applied for a hearing before the Commission, but before the 
hearing was held, entered into a Settlement Agreement with his 
employer on the basis of a 15% permanent partial disability 
rating. The Agreement signed by the applicant clearly stated 
that it constituted a final settlement of all claims arising 
out of the applicant's industrial accident. Furthermore, 
before signing the Agreement, the applicant was advised by his 
own independent counsel. The Commission subsequently approved 
the Settlement Agreement and payment was made according to its 
terms. Approximately one year later, the applicant filed a 
claim for additional compensation, alleging that his condition 
had deteriorated to the point he was totally disabled. After 
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reviewing the results of another medical examination, the 
Commission came to the conclusion that the applicant was indeed 
totally disabled and that he was thus entitled to benefits for 
permanent and total disability. The employer and its insured 
disputed this finding and alleged that the settlement agreement 
was a complete bar to the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits. In spite of a finding that all parties to 
the action conceded that the agreement in Question was intended 
at the time of its execution to be a final settlement of all of 
the applicants claims, the Utah Supreme COurt upheld the 
decision of the Commission awarding additional benefits. In so 
doing, it stated: 
We think a reasonable view of thk 
provisions of the Utah Act and due 
consideration of the objects and purposes 
of such acts in general and the history 
which prompted their enactment, requires us 
to say that the Legislature intended to 
prevent an agreement such as shown in this 
case from becoming a bar to a cl^im for 
additional compensation for an ihcrease in 
disability. 
Id. at 270. It further elaborated as follows: 
The workman, as shown by the present 
evidence, is entitled to compensation as 
for total permanent disability or surgical 
treatment as required by the order appealed 
from. At the time the agreement was 
entered into, he had the right to claim 
such compensation in case the developments 
which have now taken place shoulfl occur. 
The effect of the agreement is to release 
the company from that liability. It was in 
effect a waiver to claim a right which the 
law ffaye him. The facts establishing 
liability for results flowing from the 
injury in this case were not in dispute. 
It was not a compromise agreement as- to 
facts to establish liability. It was an 
agreement to accept payment for~"partial 
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disability under a law which gave the 
workman the right to compensation for total 
disability if it should afterward result 
from the injury. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 271. 
Mr. Wilburn's situation is nearly identical to 
Barber. As previously stated, the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement between Mr. Wilburn and the respondents provides 
only for the payment of temporary total and permanent partial 
disability benefits. It fails to address the issue of 
permanent and total disability specifically and it does not 
purport to be a full and final settlement of all of Mr. 
Wilburn's claims. Also, since the execution of the Agreement 
on November 28, 1984, Mr. Wilburn has experienced a 
deterioration of his condition just like the applicant in 
Barber. This fact is confirmed by both the tentative finding 
of permanent total disability by the Administrative Law Judge 
in his Interim Order and the medical evidence on record. For 
example, on November 1, 1985, Mr. Wilburn was seen by Dr. 
Gordon Affleck. After Mr. Wilburn's visit, Dr. Affleck 
noted: 
Gilbert comes in again to discuss his 
medical problems. He is certainly 
progressing with his problems. He is 
worse, it seems, each time that I see him 
as far as range of motion and the number of 
symptoms that he is having. . . . 
(R. at 214.) In a letter dated November 1, 1985, Dr. Affleck 
noted that Mr. Wilburn's overall disability "[had] increased 
considerably" since he first started seeing him. He also 
stated that he would rate Mr. Wilburn's permanent partial 
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impairment at that point in time to be 45% with 30% of that 
disability rating attributable to his lumbar spine alone. Of 
the 30%, he stated 18% was preexisting and 12% was due to the 
industrial incident. 
In Meecham v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 692 
1 
P.2d 783 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that claims 
for permanent and total disability are governed by Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-67 which contains no statute of limitations. 
The Court also noted that under §35-1-78, the Industrial 
Commission has continuing jurisdiction to inodify awards where 
it feels modification is justified. In the instant case, Mr. 
Wilburn has experienced a continuing deterioration of his 
condition since his industrial accident, tie is, therefore, 
entitled to invoke the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Commission and to assert a claim for permanent total 
disability. Because this is his right undfer the Act, any 
attempt to interpret the Compromise and Settlement Agreement so 
as to prevent him from exercising it must be struck down as an 
invalid waiver. 
POINT II 
A COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED 
ON THE BASIS OF DISPUTED LIABILITY MAY NOT BAR AN 
EMPLOYEE'S SUBSEQUENT CLAIM WHERE THE COMPENSABILITY 
OF THE EMPLOYEE'S CLAIM WAS NOT, IN FACT, DOUBTFUL. 
The respondents seek to uphold the validity of the 
Agreement by distinguishing the instant case from Barber. 
It is their position that Barber is not controlling because 
the compensability of Mr. Wilburn's claim was doubtful, and 
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thus subject to compromise. However, in this case, it is clear 
that compensability was not, in fact, a doubtful issue upon 
which reasonable minds could legitimately differ. Thus, the 
respondent's raising of the "no accident" defense was not done 
in good faith and the mere assertion that there was a "serious 
and disputed question as to whether or not the Employer [was] 
liable to the Applicant for any benefits under the Utah 
Workman's Compensation Act," will not render the Agreement a 
valid settlement of Mr. Wilburn's rights under the 
Compensation Act. 
The only apparent basis relied upon by the 
respondents in asserting the defense of no accident was the 
information provided by Mr. Wilburn to the insurance 
adjuster, Libby Lowther, in a recorded statement taken 
May 22, 1980, more than a month after the accident happened. 
Although the Statement is not in evidence, appellant would like 
to point out that he had the opportunity to review the 
transcription of the statement taken by Ms. Lowther. The 
transcription was fraught with places where his responses to 
the questions posed by Ms. Lowther were inaudible to the 
typist transcribing it. Many of the inaudibles appeared at 
points in the statement where Mr. Wilburn and Ms. Lowther 
were discussing how the accident happened and the onset of Mr. 
Wilburn's pain. Although Mr. Wilburn at one point stated 
that he first experienced pain a few minutes after lifting the 
power plant, he also stated in the same Statement that he 
experienced immediate pain and his testimony at the hearing 
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regarding this point was that he experienced pain immediately 
after lifting the power plant but that it became much more 
severe five to ten minutes later. (R. at £l.) It is 
uncontested that Mr. Wilburn lifted a power plant weighing 
between 70 and 90 pounds just prior to, if not simultaneous 
with, the onset of his pain. There is no Evidence of any 
non-work related activity engaged in by Mr. Wilburn between 
the lifting incident and the onset of his pain, which, even in 
the light most favorable to the respondents, set in no more 
than ten minutes after he lifted the generator. A delay of 
five to ten minutes between the lifting of an object weighing 
at least 70 pounds and the onset of suddeni severe pain is not a 
sufficient time lag to create a bona fide dispute as to the 
causal connection between the injury and Mr. Wilburn's 
employment activities. Of particular significance on this 
point is the fact that in both his Interim Order and his 
Supplemental Order, the Administrative Law Judge stated that in 
his opinion, "there was no doubt as to the compensability of 
the applicant's claim." (R. at 373.) 
It is also significant to note that prior to raising 
the no accident defense, respondents paid Mr. Wilburn 
temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits in 
the amount of $39,234.00, over a period of approximately three 
years. In addition to the aforementioned compensation, the 
respondents also paid all of Mr. Wilburn's ongoing medical 
expenses. If the respondents felt they truly had a legitimate 
defense to Mr. Wilburn's lifting accident after obtaining his 
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statement, it seems they would have asserted this defense at 
that point in time rather than continue to pay Mr. Wilburn 
over such an extended period. In view of all of the 
above-stated facts, it is highly questionable that the 
respondent's decision to raise the no accident defense was, in 
fact, based on a bona fide dispute as to compensability. 
POINT III 
IN VIEW OF THE EXPRESS STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST 
WAIVERS, ALL AMBIGUITIES IN AN ALLEGED SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND ALL REASONABLE DOUBTS AS TO THE 
INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES MUST BE RESOLVED 
IN FAVOR OF THE WORKER 
In the instant case, Mr. Wilburn testified that at 
the time he signed the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, 
it was his understanding that the only claims he was 
compromising were his then-current claims for additional 
temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. Mr. 
Wilburn's benefits were terminated by National Union on 
September 30, 1983, and he had had great difficulty in getting 
them reinstated even though he had been told by Gordon Wyatt, 
the adjuster handling his claim, that if he would furnish him 
with some additional medical information regarding his current 
condition, those benefits would be paid once again. (R. at 
76.) Prior to the time his temporary total disability benefits 
were terminated, Dr. Hess had written to Mr. Wyatt on 
June 20, 1983, giving Mr. Wilburn a higher disability rating 
than the rating he had assigned to him after his examination in 
February of 1981. Mr. Wilburn stated, however, that even 
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with the increased disability rating given him by respondent's 
own physician, no additional award had been offered to him. 
(R. at 76.) 
Following Mr. Wyatt's request for additional 
medical information, Mr. Wilburn contacted Dr. Affleck who 
also wrote directly to Mr. Wyatt. In a lfetter dated 
November 22, 1983, Dr. Affleck stated: 
I think Mr. Wilburn will be willing to 
accept a compromise position, perhaps 
receiving a cutoff date of temporary total 
disability as of the date of this letter, 
and then making a settlement as to the 
permanent partial rating of approximately 
36% as previously noted on correspondence 
from Dr. Wally Hess. 
(R. at 245.) After receiving Dr. Affleck's letter, Mr. 
Wyatt arranged for Mr. Wilburn to see Dr. )David Egli for 
a psychiatric evaluation. It was following Dr. Egli's 
evaluation that Mr. Wilburn was instructed to meet with Mr. 
Poelman for the purpose of further discussing his case. 
After his meeting with Mr. Poelman, Mr. Poelman prepared 
the Agreement in question. It is significant to note that the 
Agreement appears to follow the suggested compromise of 
benefits suggested by Dr. Affleck in his letter. 
Furthermore, when questioned specifically about his 
understanding of the Agreement and the effect it would have on 
his future benefits, Mr. Wilburn stated: 
A. Well, it reads real clearly here to 
me, in this page 3. On paragraph 3. 
It says: 'The Employer and the Fund 
agree that the Fund will reimburse the 
Employer for two-thirds of all future 
medical expense and temporary total 
disability for which liability to the 
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Applicant may be incurred.• 
(Emphasis added.) 
Q. What was your understanding of the 
language? 
A. Well, I thought at a future time I 
could go back for maybe more total 
disability, or whatever was really 
coming to me, even a permanent. I 
thought I should have had a permanent 
total disability by then, without 
going through this. 
(R. at 78.) 
Thus, it is clear from the facts and circumstances 
cited above that because he had had an increase in his 
disability ratings, and because he had provided the respondents 
with the additional medical information they had requested 
showing a further deterioration of his condition, Mr. Wilburn 
felt he was entitled to receive additional benefits. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that Mr. Wilburn was led to 
believe by the very language of the Agreement itself that the 
respondents were contemplating incurring additional liability 
on his behalf. 
Although the respondents contend that the intention 
of the parties was to compromise and settle all of Mr. 
Wilburn's claims, the express language of the agreement does 
not support this position. Counsel for respondents Interstate 
Electric and National Union drafted the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement. If the agreement was,in fact, intended 
to be a full and final compromise of all of Mr. Wilburnfs 
claims, it should have been drafted so as to clearly reflect 
this fact. In the case of Compromise and Settlement Agreements 
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affected in the area of workmen's compensation, where there is 
uncertainty as to the intentions of the parties, all reasonable 
doubts should be resolved in favor of the employee. This 
conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals in New Mexico in 
the case of Ruiz v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 526, 577 
P.2d 424 (1978). In Ruiz, the court was faced with a 
situation similar to the one at bar. The applicant had 
suffered an industrial injury which he later settled. Pursuant 
to the settlement, he signed a stipulation providing that upon 
the filing of a Satisfaction of Judgment, all of the claims he 
had against the defendant as described in his Complaint would 
be "fully and finally released, discharged and satisfied." The 
judgment on the release released "any and all claims by the 
plaintiff." When the applicant later sought to hold the 
employer liable for the payment of vocational rehabilitation 
benefits under the State Workmen's Compensation Act, the court 
found that there was a discrepancy between the judgment and the 
stipulation inasmuch as the stipulation released only the 
applicant's claims for injuries described in the Complaint. It 
further found that the only claims made by the plaintiff in the 
Complaint were for compensation for disability and medical 
expenses. It then stated, quoting from Djjnkle v. Denton, 
68 N.M. 108, 112, 359 P.2d 345, 347 (1961), as follows: 
* * * 
The primary rule of construction of 
releases is that the intention of the 
parties must govern " ~. ~. This intention 
must be gathered from the words used in the 
instrument and not from matters dehors the 
writing. In accordance with th^se 
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principles, it has been held that words in 
a release should not be construed to extend 
beyond the express consideration mentioned, 
and that such words should not be construed 
to operate as a release of indebtedness 
which the parties apparently did not 
intend 
* * * 
(Emphasis in original.) 
Id. at 427. The court then went on to state: 
New Mexico looks with disfavor on releases 
that smother a meritorious claim for 
relief. In personal injury cases, this 
policy was expressly adopted by the 
enactment of the "Release Act.• (Citations 
omitted.) Under the Compensation Act, to 
fulfill its purposes, we believe that any 
reasonable doubt as to the intentions of 
the parties and the effect of a release"" 
should be construed in favor of the 
workman. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 428. The Court reversed the decision of the lower 
court and awarded rehabilitation benefits to the plaintiff. 
In the instant case, there is, at the very least, 
reasonable doubt as to what the parties actually sought to 
accomplish by execution of the Agreement. The rule of 
construction employed by the New Mexico court should, 
therefore, be employed by this Court to render the Agreement 
invalid insofar as it purports to bar Mr. Wilburn's claim for 
permanent and total disability. This position is further 
supported by the fact that at the time he executed the 
Agreement, Mr. Wilburn was not represented by independent 
counsel. Furthermore, he was not the drafting party and the 
Agreement itself not only fails to state on its face that is a 
compromise of such a claim but it also contains ambiguous 
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language which could reasonably be interpreted by a layman as a 
reservation of his rights to pursue a claii^ i in the future if he 
experienced a further change in conditions* All of these 
factors favor a finding that the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement signed by Mr. Wilburn does not effectively bar his 
present claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Because agreements by an employed waving his/her 
rights to compensation under the Utah Workmen's Compensation 
Act are void by statute, any Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement signed by an employee must be strictly construed so 
as to avoid a waiver. Where the Agreement in question does not 
expressly purport to foreclose the assertion of all future 
claims of the workman, foreclosure of such claims should not be 
implied. Furthermore, all reasonable doubts regarding the 
intentions of the parties should be resolved in favor of the 
workman in order to effect the beneficent purposes of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. In the instant case, Mr. Wilburn 
signed an Agreement paying him additional temporary total 
disability and permanent partial disability benefits only. The 
Agreement contains language suggesting the anticipation of 
future liability by the respondents. It does not mention in 
any manner the issue of permanent total disability nor does it 
purport to be a full and final settlement bf any and all claims 
that Mr. Wilburn might raise in connection with his 
industrial injury. In view of these facts and in view of the 
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purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement herein should not be construed as a bar to 
Mr. Wilburn's current claim for permanent and total 
disability. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^Tg: day of 
1987. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
2L E. DYER 
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSiqN OF UTAH; -• j j ; • j"; ;-#« 
Case No. 81000909 
• • • • 
GILBERT WILBURN, 
Applicant-Employee, 
VS. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Employee-Carrier. 
THIS AGREEMENT entered into this date by and between 
Gilbert R. Wilburn (hereinafter called "Applicant"), Inter-
state Electric and National Union Fire Insurance (hereinafter 
collectively called "Employer"), and The ^econd Injury Fund 
(hereinafter collectively called "The Fund"), 
WHEREAS, Applicant claims to have sustained an injury by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment 
with Interstate Electric on April 14, 1980, and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have previously entered into 
a compensation agreement pursuant to which certain workmen's 
compensation benefits have been paid to the applicant and 
pursuant to which an order for reimbursement has been entered 
by the Commission whereby The Fund has been ordered to reim-
burse the Employer for 75% of all medical expenses!a*rjdj tiein- I I I * I 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
porary total disability benefits paid, and 
WHEREAS, the Applicant now claims that he is entitled to 
additional benefits but the Employer and The Fund dispute 
said claim and also deny liability for any benefits which 
have been paid or are yet claimed by Applicant under the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act, and 
WHEREAS, the Employer has paid to or on behalf of Appli-
cant temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits 
in the total sum of $41,054,66 for which the Fund has not yet 
reimbursed the Employer for its pro rata share, and 
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that there exists a 
serious and disputed question as to whether or not the 
Employer is liable to the Applicant for any benefits under 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, and 
WHEREAS, it is the intent and desire of the Applicant, 
the Employer and The Fund that the said claim of the Appli-
cant be compromised and settled so as to avoid the necessity 
of further litigation, and 
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement have carefully 
considered their respective positions with respect to said 
claims and have concluded that the settlement of claims 
herein made is fair and equitable in every respect. 
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• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
NOW, THEREFORE, in reliance of the fotegoing recitals and 
• • • •^  • ^  • • • 
in considerat ion of the following terms ahd obl igat ions^ the • • • • * • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
parties agree: 
1. Employer shall pay to Applicant ^he additional sum 
of $1,590.00 representing additional temporary total disa-
bility plus the sum of $2,184.00 representing an additional 
5% permanent partial disability over and ibove those amounts 
which it has already paid to Applicant. 
2. The Fund shall pay to Applicant the sum of $2,184.00 
representing an additional 5% permanent partial disability 
over and above those amount which The Fund has already paid 
to Applicant. 
3. The Fund shall reimburse the Employer for two-thirds 
of all temporary total disability and medical benefits here-
tofore and now paid by the Employer for which the Employer 
has not yet received any reimbursement from The Fund, which 
two-thirds reimbursement is calculated to be in the total sum 
of $28,429.77. The Employer and The Fund agree that The Fund 
will reimburse the Employer for two-thirds of all future 
medical expense and temporary total disability for which 
liability to the Applicant may be incurred. 
4. It is understood and agreed by a^id between the par-
ties that this Agreement constitutes a compromise of a dis-
puted claim and does not constitute an admission of any fact, 
contention or liability on the part of any of the parties. 
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• • • • • 
5. This Agreement shall become binding and effective 
only when approved by the Industrial Commission olfliMrah* I * I I T.#i 
• « • « • • • • • t 
• • • • • • • • • • « 
DATED this day of , 1984. 
APPLICANT: 
Gilbert R. Wilburn 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE: 
THE SECOND INJURY FUNJ 
Approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah: 
W//A WM. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING JK 
I c e r t i f y t h a t on November 28 , 19 84 
COMPROMISE AND (SETTLEMENT 
a c o p y o f t h e a t t a c h e d AGREEMENT 
was m a i l e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g p e r s o n s a t t h e f o l l o w i n g 
a d d r e s s e s , p o s t a g e p a i d : 
Slhulra Southern 
UnigaiM^nsurattce Group 
4444 Sdutfr ZOO East 
J ^ ± L a k e City>4Jtali>«410l7 
Gilbert A, Martinez 
Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
Stuart L. Poelman, Esquir^ 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Attorneys at Law i 
10 Exchange Place - Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 l|o 
Gilbert R. Wilburn 
1920 South 50 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
THE INDUStRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Diana M. Hocking 
